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Abstract 
 To remain a global superpower, China relies on the theft of intellectual property to 
continue economic growth and technology research. China co-opts students and researchers 
working in the United States to steal sensitive information, research, and technology. Using the 
analysis of five case studies, individual motivations for participating in this type of espionage, 
such as the Thousand Talents Program, are identified as primarily money and secondarily ego. 
They will continue to target students and researchers to conduct espionage because it is suited to 
their strengths, successful, and very efficient. As the global stage becomes increasingly 
competitive in defense technologies and economically, it is expected China will maintain their 
standing by devoting significant energy and resources to the theft of intellectual property. 
Understanding why academics engage in intellectual property theft on behalf of China could be 
critical to mitigating the threat in the future. 
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Introduction 
 As adversaries, the United States and China compete on the world stage in a multitude of 
arenas including defense, commerce, and technology. While they are heavily economically 
reliant on one another, they are also engaged in a technology and information war to remain 
world superpowers and gain an advantage on the other nation. To gain such an advantage, China 
often employs methods such as espionage and theft of U.S. technologies and research. 
 On September 29, 1988, China detonated a neutron bomb for the first time. However, 
China did not use technology developed in China. The technology used to detonate this bomb 
originated from the United States, an FBI investigation found (Eftimiades 2014). This marked 
the first time that Chinese theft of intellectual property from the United States was identified. 
With China’s 200+ talent recruitment programs, and especially after the implementation of the 
Thousand Talents Program in 2008, “China’s technology development and intellectual property 
portfolio has skyrocketed,” (Kang 2020). In 2019, China overtook the United States in 
applications for international patents for the first time in history (Kang 2020).  
 In January 2020, the United States’ leading chemist and chair of the Department of 
Chemistry and Chemical Biology at Harvard University was arrested and charged with lying to 
federal investigators about connections to the People’s Republic of China. Dr. Charles Lieber 
lied about his position as a “Strategic Scientist” at the Wuhan University of Technology (WUT) 
in China and his participation in the Chinese “Thousand Talents Program.” The Thousand 
Talents Program offers top positions at Chinese universities, national recognition, and large sums 
of money to individuals if they leave their current positions. The program was created by the 
Chinese government to lure top international scientists and engineers to Chinese universities in 
order to further technological innovation and industry. However, United States intelligence 
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experts, along with those from Canada and Europe, assert that the Chinese Thousand Talents 
Program also functions as a method of espionage. 
 Dr. Charles Lieber’s motivations are not certain, but the financial gains he received were 
very likely a significant contributor. It is certain, however, that Lieber directly received over 
$200,000 per month from WUT and $1.5 million dollars in funding for his research lab at WUT. 
This monetary gain was tied to his three-year Thousand Talents contract that he signed. Because 
of this position, he was expected to fabricate international research co-operation opportunities 
and to publish articles for WUT. The co-operation required of Dr. Lieber was likely used to 
expose information and research otherwise unavailable to Chinese scientists and further China’s 
technology, defense, and economic interests. 
 Chinese theft of technologies, research, and sensitive information is a top security 
concern for the United States. According to the Director of the National Counterintelligence and 
Security Center, the annual estimated cost of Chinese theft of American trade secrets is 
“anywhere from $300billion to $600billion” dollars (Reuters 2020). Numerous agencies, 
including the FBI, have identified this type of espionage as a top threat now and in the future for 
the United States. Thus, identifying the methods and motivations of this espionage is critical to 
understanding and preventing it. One of the most important phenomena to understand is the 
individual motivations to engage in this type of espionage on behalf of the People’s Republic of 
China. How and why individuals participate will be explored in this work. Understanding this 
important component of the espionage will help further the discussion about this method of 
Chinese espionage.  
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Chinese Espionage Using Academics 
 China relies heavily on civilian academics to conduct espionage. The Chinese Thousand 
Talents Program, as introduced and explained, is a prime example of this. It is promoted by the 
Chinese as a scientific recruiting tool, but intelligence agencies recognize it also operates as a 
method of stealing research, information, and technology that would otherwise be inaccessible to 
Chinese academics. The main method used by the Chinese to acquire technology is with 
scholarly exchange programs. It is estimated that 15,000 Chinese students arrive to the United 
States annually (Eftimiades 2014). As a result of this, the United States revoked 1,000 Chinese 
student and researcher visas in September of 2020 (O’Malley 2020). 
 To recruit these students and researchers, China targets their efforts in a few different 
ways. According to Nicholas Eftimiades (2014, p. 16), “the process of obtaining intelligence 
related information through scientific...delegations is a common form of low-level espionage.” 
Intelligence officers embedded in scientific delegations serve two purposes. The first is to 
identify personnel with access and potential to be recruited and the second is to collect 
information on facilities and research programs. Collecting this type of information is critical to 
the recruitment of researchers and therefore the collection of beneficial intelligence and 
technologies. This method involves recruiting researchers already in the U.S., but China also 
targets students and researchers in China who can steal the technology while in the United States. 
 China targets students and researchers to obtain very specific intelligence and 
technologies. The PRC are seeking information and research on U.S. Technologies and research 
specifically related to defense. The academics and the research they target relates specifically to 
the technologies required to advance the capabilities of the PLA (O’Malley 2020). “Nearly half 
of Chinese espionage efforts target U.S. military and space technologies,” (Eftimiades 2019, p. 
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126). Thus, it is clear that at least one of their primary objectives is to gain advantages in defense 
technologies. The revocation of visas in September 2020 was targeted at Chinese academics 
working on technologies that would further this objective of the People’s Republic of China. 
 China’s use of individual academics is their primary method of intelligence collection 
related to intellectual property. This is one of the most effective methods, but they engage in the 
practice for other reasons as well, including economic reliance, access to human resources, and 
efficiency. According to Nicholas Eftimiades (2014), China’s economy will be increasingly 
reliant on the theft of intellectual property. “The combination of a stagnant economy and an 
increasingly competitive global economic environment will force China to rely more heavily on 
[stealing intellectual property]...for modernization,” (Eftimiades 2014, p.126). In addition, it is 
estimated that roughly 350,000 students and researchers study in the United States each year 
(Cohen and Marquardt 2019) and the large ethnic Chinese community in the United States serves 
as another advantage. Instead of recruiting career intelligence officers, China relies on recruiting 
citizens, with no intelligence collection or espionage experience, who travel and conduct 
research with a legitimate purpose (Eftimiades 2019).  
 This methodology provides significant benefit to the Chinese and also speaks to 
individual motivations. The Chinese approach is sometimes called the “thousand grains of sand” 
approach, alluding to their use of “large numbers of amateur collectors,”(Munoz, p.33). It allows 
China to take advantage of individuals with high technical ability and field knowledge, 
something intelligence officers often do not have. Few individuals who engage in this type of 
espionage are actually charged with espionage.  The use of citizens to collect intelligence, often 
as a secondary objective to another legitimate one, makes it difficult for the United States to 
identify and prosecute separate low-level instances of theft as espionage (Eftimiades 2014). 
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Thus, it is lower risk for the individuals compared to a career intelligence officer with the 
primary objective of espionage. The practice is low-risk, high-reward for both the Chinese and 
the individuals engaging in it.  
 According to Hannas et al. (2013), the Chinese target ethnically Chinese scholars 
overseas to conduct espionage on behalf of the People’s Republic of China. Yun and Lin (2001) 
support this claim with the explanation that “…overseas Chinese scholars and ethnic Chinese 
specialists[‘]… hearts belong to their families and country” (Hannas et al. 2013, p.166). The 
motivations of these individuals to engage in espionage are built on the foundation of 
nationalism (Hannas et al. 2013). However, this foundation requires a more individualized effort 
and approach to recruit and convince them (Hannas et al. 2013). Individual motivations to 
engage in espionage activities are varied, but four categories of motivation for espionage exist: 
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Hypothesis and Methods 
 In this work, the central research question is why individuals will engage in intellectual 
property theft on behalf of the People’s Republic of China. The research mentioned supports, in 
the case of overseas ethnically Chinese academics, a core sense of nationalism and a more direct 
motivator can explain an individual’s motivations to engage in espionage. A qualitative analysis 
of case studies will be used to examine these direct motivations.  
 The independant variable is the motivation of the individual. 
 The dependent variable is if the individual will engage in espionage. 
 The four motivations of espionage- money, ideology, coercion, and ego- are general 
psychological and social factors that contribute to individuals’ behavior. In the context of 
espionage, money is defined as “selfish motivation…for wealth or material gain” (Charney et al. 
2016, p.72), including both the desire for outright gain and the desire to escape financial 
hardship. This often presents as an individual deciding espionage is the “best or only way” 
(Charney et al. 2016, p.72) to attain such wealth. Ideology is defined as “a shared self of beliefs 
about how the world is or ought to be,”(Charney et al. 2016, p.72), and includes direct 
motivation to complete the espionage or to rationalize the espionage. Coercion is where the 
individual does not act “of his or her own free will but, rather, is effectively forced to commit 
espionage through fear of punishment, exposure of wrongdoing, or some other undesirable 
outcome,” (Charney et al. 2016, p.73). Ego is a much broader category than the rest, because it 
can cover so many motives. (Charney et al. 2016). However, a more specific definition from 
Charney et al. (2016,pg.73) includes “desire for challenge, adventure, and excitement”, 
“narcissism”, and behaviors to enhance or defend the individual’s image. 
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 These four variables largely describe the reasons that individuals will engage in 
espionage. Espionage is defined, for the purpose of this work, as “knowingly and willfully 
communicating, furnishing, transmitting, or otherwise making any classified information 
available to an unauthorized person, or publishing, or using it in any manner prejudicial to the 
safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the 
detriment of the United States,” 18 U.S.C. § 798 (2012). Fischer (2000) found that money was 
the most frequent motivator for espionage identified by both volunteer spies and intelligence, or 
recruited, career officers. Fischer (2000) also found that there was often more than one 
motivation. 
 In order to answer the central question, what motivates academics steal intellectual 
property for the People’s Republic of China, case studies will be chosen and analyzed to 
determine individual motivations. A purposive method will be used to choose case studies. They 
will be included if they can be accessed from the Department of Justice and they fit the following 
criteria: the individual is an academic (student or researcher), the specific act related to 
espionage is documented, the act was made possible by their role as an academic, the 
Department of Justice has published details on the case, the individual has been charged with a 
crime or found guilty of a crime, the aforementioned crime is espionage or closely related to 
espionage, and there is sufficient detail to describe the case and make a determination on 
motivation. 
 Determination of the individual’s motivation(s) will be identified based on the definitions 
of money, ideology, coercion, and ego above. A primary motivation will be determined if the 
details of the case signal a clear motivator and there is an absence of the other three. If a 
secondary motivation is signaled by the case details and there is a clear absence of the other two, 
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a determination will be made for a secondary motivator as well. The determination of a primary, 
and possible secondary motivation, is dependent on the case details available. Any determination 
is accompanied by an assumption that there may be influential factors that are not available for 
analysis.  
 The hypothesis tested in this research, using the independent and dependent variables, 
will be related to the individual motivations and whether the individual engages in espionage. 
However, consistent with the case study method and mode of analysis, the research will only 
include instances where the individual engaged in espionage. Thus, the determination of primary 
motivation, and a secondary one if applicable, for each case study will be the method of testing 
each hypothesis.  
 Money Hypothesis: Money is the motivation for an individual to engage in espionage or 
espionage related activities.  
 Ideology Hypothesis: Ideology is the motivation for an individual to engage in espionage 
or espionage related activities.  
 Coercion Hypothesis: Coercion is the motivation for an individual to engage in espionage 
or espionage related activities.  
 Ego Hypothesis: Ego is the motivation for an individual to engage in espionage or 
espionage related activities.  
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Analysis 
Case Study 1: Yanqing Ye 
 In April 2019, Yanqing Ye was stopped at Logan International Airport after allegedly 
lying about her status as a student on her J-1 visa application (DOJ Jan. 2020). Yanqing Ye later 
identified herself as a lieutenant in the People’s Liberation Army of China (PLA) and a member 
of the Chinese Communist Party. From October 2017 to April 2019, Ye studied at Boston 
University’s Department of Physics, Chemistry, and Biomedical Engineering (DOJ Jan. 2020). 
While claiming she had little contact with two PLA officers and professors at the Chinese 
National University of Defense Technology (NUDT), a search of her electronic devices found 
she was working at the direction of one of the professors (DOJ Jan. 2020).  
The professor, also serving as a PLA Colonel, directed Ye to access and assess U.S. 
Military websites and projects, compile the work of two U.S. Scientists which related to robotics 
and computer science, conduct research, and send other U.S. information and documents back to 
China (DOJ Jan. 2020). At the direction of the other NUDT professor, she also planned to 
collaborate on a “research paper about a risk assessment model designed to decipher data for 
military applications” (DOJ Jan. 2020). It is alleged that she lied about these connections to the 
PLA and the CCP in addition to her status as a student (DOJ Jan. 2020). Ye is charged with 
acting as an agent of a foreign government, visa fraud, making false statements, and conspiracy.  
 From the details of the case, only a primary motive for Yanqing Ye was identified. Her 
position as a PLA officer and CCP member indicates strong allegiance to the People’s Republic 
of China and the Chinese Communist Party. In addition, her primary objective for being in the 
United States was to operate as a foreign agent and complete assignments for PLA officers. 
These details signal her primary motivation is ideological. This determination is made with high 
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confidence. Numerous details show ideological motivations while there is a lack of details 
indicating any motivation related to money, coercion, or ego.  
 In Case Study 1, Yanqing Ye, the Ideology Hypothesis was supported. 
 
Case Study 2: Xiao-Jiang Li 
 In May 2020, Xiao-Jiang Li, a former professor at Emory University, pleaded guilty to 
filing a false tax return (DOJ May 2020). In 2011, while a professor at Emory University, Li 
joined the Chinese Thousand Talents Program (DOJ May 2020). From 2012-2018, Li conducted 
research on Huntington’s disease and shared the research with two other Universities in China as 
part of the Thousand Talents Program (DOJ May 2020). Li held two other professorships at both 
the Chinese Academy of Sciences and Jinan University, the same universities where he shared 
the research (DOJ May 2020). During these six years, Li was paid at least $500,000 by these 
Chinese universities (DOJ May 2020).  
 Xiao-Jiang Li’s wrongdoing was brought to light by the National Institute of Health 
(NIH). After reviewing Li’s research grant applications, they became concerned he had failed to 
disclose foreign research activity (DOJ May 2020). Li had indeed failed to disclose foreign 
income and affiliations, including his participation in the Thousand Talents Program. Li was then 
investigated by Emory University and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (DOJ May 2020). This 
investigation resulted in his sentence of 1 year of probation, order to file tax returns for 2012-
2018 to include earned foreign income, and restitution (DOJ May 2020).  
 From the details of the case, a primary motive for Xiao-Jiang Li was identified. His 
position as a researcher in the United States for many years before joining the Thousand Talents 
program is likely an indicator espionage was not his primary objective in the country. This 
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assertion is based on the patterns related to how China co-opts academics. The financial gains 
from the Thousand Talents program are significant. Thus, it is determined that Li’s primary 
motivation is money. This determination is made with moderate confidence, supported by some 
details showing a motivation to gain wealth from the espionage and a lack of details to support 
another primary motivation. The determination of the primary motive is made with moderate 
confidence because there are only financial details given on the case, and few others. 
 In Case Study 2, Xiao-Jiang Li, the Money Hypothesis was supported. 
 
Case Study 3: Song Guo Zheng 
 For over 20 years, Song Guo Zheng has completed medical research in the United States. 
However, in May 2020, The Ohio State University confronted the rheumatology professor about 
his foreign affiliations with China (DOJ Jul. 2020). Allegedly, he has also been part of China’s 
Thousand Talents Program since 2013 while maintaining his position at The Ohio State 
University (DOJ Jul. 2020). Zheng allegedly engaged in a “sophisticated scheme to use 
approximately $4.1 million in grants from the National Institute of Health” to conduct research 
to advance Chinese knowledge in the areas of rheumatology and immunology (DOJ Jul. 2020). 
This research would further the “research goals of the Chinese Communist party” and 
supplement Chinese technologies (DOJ Jul. 2020). As part of his Thousand Talents contract, he 
allegedly received $214,000 as an annual salary, $1.4million in research funding and a team of 
researchers at Sun Yat-Set University in China, and an additional $64,000 from Guilin Medical 
University (DOJ Jul. 2020). As a result of his plans to commit grant fraud and the undisclosed 
foreign affiliations, Zheng was placed on paid leave, which was soon changed to unpaid leave, 
from OSU.  
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 Shortly after he was placed on unpaid leave, he abandoned his position at OSU and was 
arrested while attempting to fly on charter flights from Columbus to China (DOJ Jul. 2020). 
Zheng fled when he allegedly learned that OSU was investigating whether he broke federal laws 
related to research funding and foreign affiliations (DOJ Jul. 2020). When arrested, he was found 
with “three large bags, one small suitcase and a briefcase containing two laptops, three cellular 
telephones, several USB drives, several silver bars, expired Chinese passports for his family, 
deeds for property in China and other items” (DOJ Jul. 2020). Zheng was charged with fraud or 
bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds and making false statements. 
 From the details of the case, a primary and secondary motive for Song Guo Zheng were 
identified. His position as a researcher in the United States for many years before joining the 
Thousand Talents program is likely an indicator espionage was not his primary objective in the 
country. This assertion is based on the patterns related to how China co-opts academics. The 
financial gains from the Thousand Talents contract are significant, supporting the determination 
that Zheng’s primary motivation is money. This determination is made with details to support a 
motivation to gain wealth with espionage, and a lack of details to support another motivation as 
the primary one. 
 In addition, sufficient evidence exists to make the determination of a secondary 
motivation. Zheng’s research funding, team, and potential to contribute to the Chinese research 
on rheumatology and immunology cannot be ignored. These offerings made in the Thousand 
Talents contract and related case details are significant and likely indicate that ego was a factor 
in his motivation.  
However, these determinations are only made with moderate confidence. While 
numerous case details exist to support money as the primary motivation and ego as the secondary 
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motivation, the belongings found on Zheng raise questions. The expired passports of his family 
members specifically raise questions of potential coercion and the silver bars and property deeds 
could signify wealth. While these details raise questions, they do not alter the determinations of 
motivation. The case details support a primary motivation of money and a secondary motivation 
of ego.  
In Case Study 3, Song Guo Zheng, the Money Hypothesis was supported. 
 
Case Study 4: Hao Zhang 
In August 2020, Chinese professor Hao Zhang was found guilty of economic espionage, 
stealing trade secrets, and conspiracy (DOJ Sept. 2020). From 2010-2015, Zhang “conspired to 
and did steal trade secrets relating to Surface Acoustic Wave (‘SAW’) and Bulk Acoustic Wave 
(‘BAW’) filters…” (DOJ Sept. 2020). These technologies are often used in cellphones and other 
devices to filter radio frequencies (DOJ Sept. 2020). Zhang stole the technologies from two 
companies: Avago and Skyworks (DOJ Sept. 2020).  
Zhang used these trade secrets to obtain numerous benefits. First, Zhang began plans to 
start companies in China to sell manufactured goods using the stolen technologies. Zhang also 
used the trade secrets, and his other experiences, to obtain a professorship at Tianjin University 
(TJU) in China in order to share the technologies with others (DOJ Sept. 2020). He sought to 
create a Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems lab at the university (DOJ Sept. 2020). He started 
the businesses in China and shared the information at Tianjin University knowing it would 
benefit the Chinese government through these entities (DOJ Sept. 2020). In the United States, he 
obtained patents in his own name using stolen trade secrets from Avago (DOJ Sept. 2020).  
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From the details of the case, a primary and secondary motive for Hao Zhang was 
identified. There are numerous benefits from the espionage acts Zhang committed, including his 
companies in China, professorship at Tianjin University, and the Chinese and U.S. Patents he 
obtained. The profits from the companies and patents are highly likely a main focus for Zhang. 
In addition, his professorship at TJU offers income and a prestigious position and lab. These 
details show his primary motivation is money, with a secondary motivation of ego. This 
determination is made with high confidence. Numerous details show motivations related to 
money, some details show ego motivations, and none indicate any motivation related to ideology 
or coercion. 
In Case Study 4, Hao Zhang, the Money Hypothesis was supported. 
 
Case Study 5: Yu Zhou 
In April 2021, Yu Zhou was sentenced to nearly three years in prison for conspiring to 
steal trade secrets and research from Nationwide Children’s Hospital (DOJ Apr. 2021). Over the 
course of ten years, Zhou and his spouse, a co-conspirator, aimed to steal and profit from new lab 
technologies developed at Nationwide Children’s Hospital (DOJ Apr. 2021). With 
encouragement from the Chinese government, Zhou stole trade secrets from the hospital, created 
businesses in China to sell the stolen technology, and sought to supplement the research and 
development of similar projects in China (DOJ Apr. 2021). This encouragement took the form of 
“benefits” from numerous Chinese government organizations, including entities used transfer 
technology and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (DOJ Apr. 2021). 
From the details of the case, a primary motive for Yu Zhou was identified. His objective 
was to create the company in China to sell a product using the stolen scientific research. This 
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objective was also supported by the Chinese government through financial and material gains 
provided to Zhou. Thus, it is determined with high confidence that Zhou’s primary motive is 
money. This determination is made with details showing a motivation to gain wealth from 
espionage, and a lack of details to support another primary motivation. 
In Case Study 5, Yu Zhou, the Money Hypothesis was supported.  
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Conclusion 
The case studies show that academics who complete espionage on behalf the People’s 
Republic of China are nearly always motivated by money. In four case studies, money was 
identified as the primary motivation for an individual to complete espionage. In two case studies, 
it was identified as the only discernable motivation. In the other two case studies with money as 
the primary motivation, ego was identified as a secondary motivator. In the only case study 
which did not identify money as the primary motivator, the individual was motivated by 
ideology.  
However, the patterns of Chinese espionage using academics do not support this case 
study as generalizable. Yanqing Ye was an officer in the PLA and a member of the CCP before 
becoming a student researcher in the United States. As supported by research, China usually co-
opts students and researchers to steal technology as a secondary objective to their primary 
purpose in the United States. However, Ye’s espionage more closely resembles traditional 
methods of espionage rather than how China usually recruits academics. Although a useful case 
study, this is an outlier.  
In general, the academics who engaged in espionage for China did so in order to gain 
wealth or material. The Money Hypothesis is supported by the analysis of five case studies. In 
addition, some merit can be given to the Ego Hypothesis. The Ideology Hypothesis, while 
supported by one case study, is not indicative of a pattern. None of the five case studies 
supported coercion as a motivator.  
The potential does exist for individuals to be motivated by coercion or ideology. As it 
was mentioned before, the fundamental patriotism felt by ethnic Chinese and the desire to 
improve their country does likely make them more willing to participate. However, without 
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individual interviews with deep questioning, it is impossible to know exactly why these 
individuals engaged in espionage. In future research, it would be useful to explore the question 
with these types of individual interviews in order to truly understand the psychology and true 
motivators for these individuals. 
The intelligence community is aware of the threat China poses with this type of 
intellectual property espionage. “We assess that China's intelligence services will exploit the 
openness of American society, especially academia and the scientific community, using a variety 
of means," says the intelligence community's World Wide Threat Assessment (Cohen and 
Marquardt 2019). In recent Presidential administrations, the threat has been addressed more 
seriously. This led to the revocation of Chinese student visas and increasing attention from both 
intelligence agencies and elected officials. This work, a qualitative analysis using Department of 
Justice sources, determined that money is the most prevalent motivator for academics to engage 
in activities related to espionage on behalf of the People’s Republic for China. Addressing and 
reducing this type of Chinese espionage is a goal for many government agencies, including the 
FBI. Perhaps reducing this type of threat from academics can be addressed by focusing on the 
financial gains sought by individuals. Effective mitigation strategies will be critical to the 
continued growth and stability of the U.S. economy, commerce, national security, and 
technology development.  
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